Regulation of Television Program Content By the Federal Communications Commission by Sweeney, Walter H.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 5
1974
Regulation of Television Program Content By the
Federal Communications Commission
Walter H. Sweeney
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Communications Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter H. Sweeney, Regulation of Television Program Content By the Federal Communications Commission, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 233 (1974).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/5
REGULATION OF TELEVISION PROGRAM CONTENT BY
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Walter H. Sweeney*
On Thursday, September 20, 1973, from 9:00 p.m. to 11:15 p.m.,
the Columbia Broadcasting System presented "Bonnie and Clyde,"
a film featuring extraordinary portrayals of violence, including
close-ups of participants being shot in the face. This movie was
scheduled by CBS to counteract the highly publicized tennis match
between Bobby Riggs and Billie Jean King being shown by the
American Broadcasting Company. The following Saturday, during
prime time, ABC aired "Rosemary's Baby," a horror film involving
the possession of a pregnant woman by Mephistopheles leading to
the birth of a devil. This program followed the children-oriented
"Patridge Family" show. While audience figures for these two pro-
grams have not been published at the time of this writing, there is
no question that hundreds of thousands of children between the ages
of two and eleven viewed them with or without parents present.
Many of these children most probably suffered irreparable dam-
age to their mental health from witnessing the excessive violence
and horror contained in these two films without their or their par-
ents realizing it. Since the television industry is purportedly regu-
lated by the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the FCC), the broadcast of programs such as "Bonnie
and Clyde" and "Rosemary's Baby" during hours in which substan-
tial numbers of children in their formative years are in the viewing
audience raises the vital question of the extent, if any, to which the
FCC is empowered to supervise the content of television programs.
The FCC, under existing law, has broad regulatory powers over
program content and may act to curtail programming containing
excessive violence and horror which is not in the public interest.
The Nature of the Problem
By virtue of the Communications Act of 1934,1 Congress pre-
empted the regulation of broadcasting, and the FCC is responsible
* Member of the Virginia and District of Columbia Bars; J.D., George Washington Univer-
sity, 1965, member of the law firm of Welch & Morgan.
1. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, §§ 1-5, 48 Stat. 1064.
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for such regulation. 2 The guidelines for the FCC's administration
are set forth in the Communications Act, the FCC's Rules and Reg-
ulations and policy statements, and relevant decisions of the FCC
and the courts. Its regulatory powers are founded in the authority
to grant applications for the construction of broadcast facilities, for
licenses to operate the facilities, and for renewal of licenses, as well
as other miscellaneous applications. A broadcast facility may be
constructed only after the FCC determines that the applicant is
legally, financially, and technically qualified to construct and oper-
ate the station. The applicant must propose an acceptable program
service and show that the public interest will be served by the opera-
tion of the station. 3 Because applicants are cognizant of the FCC's
preferences, their applications for construction permits usually
abound with good programming intentions. Unfortunately, the good
intentions generally wane in light of the commercial reality that is
gained after the station goes on the air. After all, broadcasters are
in business to make a profit, and advertisers simply do not buy air-
time unless they have some assurance that a reasonable number of
viewers will see their message. According to most broadcasters, tele-
vision viewers are not particularly enamoured by many of the pro-
grams which the FCC considers desirable. Nonetheless, a broadcast
license expires three years after its granting unless renewed by an
application to the FCC.
The license renewal application is basically the same as the origi-
nal application for the facility, but the applicant is expected to show
a "performance" in compliance with its "promise" in the previous
application. The FCC has the power to deny an application for
renewal of a license if the public interest has not been served by the
applicant, but, unless the applicant has been guilty of serious mis-
conduct, the grant of the application is usually a pro forma exercise
in "brochure manship." As a result of this attitude, broadcast licen-
sees have become convinced that they hold a vested interest in their
licenses, and any implication to the contrary is considered by many
to be the equivalent of an attack upon motherhood. This attitude
has led to program policies in which commercial value takes priority
2. Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1950).
3. An applicant is required to ascertain the community needs of its proposed service area
and to design programming to meet those needs. The FCC looks with favor on certain types
of programming, i.e., news, public affairs, instructional, agricultural and religious programs,
and editorials. This is especially true if the programs are produced by the station.
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over the public interest. The result of such policies is the broadcast
'of programs containing excessive portrayals of violence and horror
such as "Bonnie and Clyde" and "Rosemary's Baby."
The FCC's Position
An application for renewal of a license does not require any details
regarding the content of the applicant's past or proposed program-
ming. Rather, the applicant need only recite the percentages of air-
time devoted to certain types of programs and describe some of the
programs which meet the needs of the service area. Thus, the FCC
is basicallly unaware of the content of a licensee's programs unless
complaints are filed. The FCC's lack of concern with this vital area
of interest is professedly due to the first amendment, and Section
326 of the Communications Act of 1934. The first amendment pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press," and Section 326 of the Communications
Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter [Act] shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio commu-
nications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regula-
tion or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.'
There is no question that the communication of ideas by means
of radio and television is a form of expression entitled to protection
by the first amendment from governmental abridgement.5 It is also
readily apparent that the Communications Act prohibits "censor-
ship" by the FCC. The FCC has held that complaints concerning
offensive programming by a broadcast licensee are not an impedi-
ment to the grant of an application for renewal of a license.' This
holding is not surprising since the FCC has steadfastly maintained,
in decisions and policy statements, that it does not have the legal
power to supervise the program content of its licensees. It is submit-
ted that the FCC has much broader powers than it cares to admit
4. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
5. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
6. Pacifica Foundation, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 817 (1969).
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and that the FCC may lawfully supervise certain types of program
content.
To digress a moment, in 1960 the Attorney General of the United
States released a report to the President entitled "Deceptive Prac-
tices in the Broadcasting Media." 7 A portion of this report dealt
with "rigged" television quiz shows, "payola," and the FCC's pow-
ers to curb abuses in these areas. The Report, noting the provisions
of the first amendment and Section 326 of the Communications Act,
stated that:
. . . [A] review of existing authority indicates that the Commis-
sion may, without running afoul of constitutional or statutory safe-
guards of freedom of speech, give considerable weight to advertising
practices and programming in the context of licensing, rule making
or investigative proceedings. It is true that the statutory provision
relating to censorship and the First Amendment delineate the outer
limits of the Commission's powers. Yet, within those limits consider-
able scope is left for effective regulatory action. (Emphasis added).8
Shortly after the Attorney General's Report, the FCC released a
policy statement in which it proposed a number of rules and regula-
tions to control quiz shows and "payola." 9 In this policy statement,
the FCC detailed the limitations imposed upon it by the first
amendment and Section 326 of the Communications Act, and said:
Although the Commission must determine whether the total pro-
gram service of broadcasters is reasonably responsive to the interests
and needs of the public they serve, it may not condition the grant,
denial or revocation of a broadcast license upon its own subjective
determination of what is or is not a good program. To do so would
"lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution." (Emphasis added).10
The FCC's view of its control over programming was reiterated
later in the statement:
7. 19 P & F RADi REG. 1901 (1960).
8. Id. at 1920.
9. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20
P & F RADIO REG. 1901 (1960).
10. Id. at 1907, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1941).
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• . . [T]he Commission in administering the Act and the courts
in interpreting it have consistently maintained that responsibility for
the selection and presentation of broadcast material ultimately de-
volves upon the individual station licensee, and that the fulfillment
of the public interest requires the free exercise of his independent
judgment. Accordingly, the Communications Act "does not essay to
regulate the business of the licensee." The Commission is given no
supervisory control of the programs, of business management or of
policy. . . Congress intended to leave competition in the business of
broadcasting where it found it. . .(Emphasis added)."
An attempt was then made by the FCC to clarify its limited
powers under the public interest standard:
In view of the fact that a broadcaster is required to program his
station in the public interest, convenience and necessity, it follows
despite the limitations of the First Amendment and Section 326 of
the Act, that his freedom to program is not absolute. The Commis-
sion does not conceive that it is barred by the Constitution or by
statute from exercising any responsibility with respect to program-
ming. It does conceive that the manner or extent of the exercise of
such responsibility can introduce constitutional or statutory ques-
tions. It readily concedes that it is precluded from examining a pro-
gram for taste or content, unless the recognized exceptions to censor-
ship apply: for example, obscenity, profanity, indecency, programs
inciting to riots, programs designed or inducing toward the commis-
sion of crime, lotteries, etc. (Emphasis added).'2
Thus, the FCC admitted that it does have certain "responsibili-
ties" with respect to programming relevant to the determination of
whether a licensee is operating in the public interest, convenience,
and necessity, but it has used the specter of "censorship" to avoid
its "responsibilities" except in certain unique situations where
moral indignation appears to have entered the decisional process.
For example, in 1931, the FCC's denial of a renewal of a radio
license, in part due to the licensee's use of its facility to diagnose
listener's ills and prescribe treatments, was upheld since the con-
11. Id. at 1908, citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (a case dealing with economic competition rather than whether or
not a type of programming was in the public interest).
12. Id. at 1909.
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duct was inimical to the public health and safety. 1 3 In Trinity Meth-
odist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission,4 the court held
that the FCC's denial of an application for renewal was not a viola-
tion of the first amendment where the licensee had allowed frequent
defamatory attacks on various individuals. In 1955, the FCC held
that it was not "censorship" to deny a license renewal application
on the basis of the applicant's overall operation, which included the
broadcast of programs in aid of an illegal activity (off-track betting
on horse races).,5 In another decision, the FCC held that considera-
tion would be given to an applicant's past communications media
activities which showed a pattern of unfair treatment of social and
religious groups. 6
An almost amusing decision is Palmetto Broacasting Co.," in
which the FCC denied renewal due to the licensee's broadcast of
coarse and vulgar material. The question of whether the broadcasts
were obscene, which would have been a clear violation of the law,
was never reached. Rather, the FCC determined that the material
was "patently vulgar," and, in defense of its holding, stated:
Inasmuch as record-disc jockey type of entertainment is so popular
and widespread on radio, the argument comes down to this: Radio
could become predominantly a purveyor of smut and patent vulgar-
ity-yet unless the matter broadcast reached the level of obscenity
under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the Commission even though charged to
issue licenses only when it is in the public interest, would be power-




A clear abdication by the FCC of responsibility for television
violence occurred in 1968. In June of that year, the Chairman of the
13. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
14. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
15. Community Broadcasting Serv., 13 P & F RADIO REG. 179 (1955).
16. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Inc., 4 P & F RADIO REG. 105 (1948). Contra, National Anti-
Vivisection Society, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 166 (1964) (which dealt with complaints against
the telecasting of bull fights); Station KTTM, 4 F.C.C.2d 190, 7 P & F RADIo REG. 565 (1966)
(which was concerned with the broadcast of anti-Semitic material). See also, Appalachian
Broadcasting Corp., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 1402 (1957).
17. 23 P & F RADIO REG. 483 (1962).
18. Id. at 485.
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FCC wrote a letter to the Honorable Milton Eisenhower, Chairman
of the National Commission on the Cause and Prevention of Viol-
ence, in which the Chairman expressed the FCC's concern with
repeated charges that television violence "contributed to a popular
acceptance of violence as a more or less normal part of our life," and
said the FCC was reluctant to undertake research on the subject
since it was "the licensing agency for the stations involved and. ..
hesitant about encroaching on their freedom of program choice."
The Chairman urged Mr. Eisenhower to study the problem.
The Violence Commission accepted the Chairman's offer of coop-
eration and submitted a series of questions concerning the subject
to the FCC on October 3, 1968. On November 6, 1968, the FCC
replied by letter to Mr. Robert K. Baker, Co-director of the Com-
mission's Media Task Force. In that letter, the Violence Commis-
sion's questions and the FCC's responses thereto were set forth as
follows:
1. Does the Commission [FCC] have any evidence that the por-
trayal of violence in entertainment programming may increase
the probability that viewers of such programs will engage in vio-
lent behavior? If so please identify the source of the evidence
(hearings, academic studies, etc.) and a two or three sentence
summary of the evidence.
The Commission [FCC] itself has conducted no research into this
subject. See our letter to Chairman Milton Eisenhower, dated June
12, 1968, FCC 68-622. It is, of course, aware of studies which have
been made in this area. We believe that these studies are inconclusive
and that they have already been identified to your Commission.
2. What is the Commission's [FCC's] policy with regard to the
portrayal of violence in entertainment programming, by what
procedures is that policy implemented, and how effective are
these procedures?
The Commission [FCC] has adopted no policy directed to this
particular aspect of programming. As we stated in the above cited
letter, we have been reluctant to undertake research in this area
because we are the licensing agency for the stations involved and are
hesitant about encroaching on their freedom of program choice; on
the other hand, we believe that this is a matter warranting thorough
study by your Commission and others. See also, response to A-3
below.
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3. If there were evidence that the portrayal of violence on television
or that certain modes of portraying violence increased the proba-
bility that some viewers would behave in an unlawful and violent
manner, does the Commission [FCC] have any authority to
impose any sanctions for the purpose of eliminating, reducing, or
regulating portrayls of violence in entertainment programming?
For example, would it be appropriate for the Commission [FCC]
to consider the violent content of program material in a license
renewal or rule making proceeding?
As you know, Section 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, prohibits consorship [sic] of broadcast matter by the
Commission. On the other hand, the Act provides that the Commis-
sion shall grant or renew broadcast applications only if it finds that
the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served thereby.
While these two provisions provide the framework for consideration
of your question, it is, we believe, difficult to answer that question in
an abstract context. Any sanction imposed by the Commission upon
the basis that particular program content was likely to have harmful
effects would raise, as a general matter (e.g., excluding matters such
as obscenity, lotteries, etc.), serious questions under both Section 326
and the Constitution.
We stress that the licensee should be aware of the problem posed
by his portrayal of violence and that he should take it into account
in his programming judgments. Continuing study efforts in this area
are clearly appropriate.' 9
It is readily apparent that the FCC did not want to answer the
difficult questions raised by the Violence Commission and avoided
doing so by weakly characterizing them as "abstract." The sheer
hypocrisy of the FCC in this matter is revealed by the fact that, in
1968, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission and United
States,"0 held that the FCC's determination that anti-smoking mes-
sages were entitled to equal time with cigarette commercials under
the "Fairness Doctrine" did not violate either the first amendment
or Section 326 of the Communications Act. The court noted that:
19. Letter from the FCC to Mr. Robert K. Baker dated November 6, 1968.
20. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In general the "Fairness Doctrine" requires licensees
to provide equal time for opposing views concerning controversial public issues and personal
attacks. Characteristically, the FCC refused to require licensees to provide the time and left
it up to individual stations.
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If agency power to designate programming "not in the public inter-
est" is a slippery slope, the Commission and the courts started down
it too long ago to go back to the top now unless Congress or the
Constitution sends them. But Congress has apparently specifically
endorsed this understanding of the public interest. And whatever the
limits imposed by the First Amendment, we do not think it requires
eradicating every trace of a programming component from the public
interest standard.
The power to refuse a license on grounds of past or proposed pro-
gramming necessarily entails some power to define the stations' pub-
lic interest obligations with respect to programming. (Emphasis
added) .21
Banzhaf held that the "public health" is included within the "pub-
lic interest" standard, that cigarette smoking is dangerous to the
public health, and, that, therefore, the FCC's ruling was permissi-
ble. In dictum, the court stated that the FCC rarely used its power
to specify material which the public interest forbids to be broad-
cast."
Thus, when the FCC replied to the Violence Commission's ques-
tions in 1968, it knew that it could curtail television programming
which is injurious to the "public health" without running afoul of
the first amendment and Section 326 of the Communications Act.
Notwithstanding that knowledge, the FCC refused to state that it
had the authority to impose sanctions designed toeliminate, reduce,
or regulate television violence in its response to the Violence Com-
mission's inquiry.
To make matters worse, the FCC completely disregarded the
Violence Commission's findings in September, 1969, that, "a con-
stant diet of violent behavior on television has an adverse effect on
human character and attitudes," and that, "violence on television
encourages violent forms of behavior, and fosters moral and social
values about violence in daily life which are unacceptable in a civi-
lized society. ' 23 The Commission also concluded that television is a
''contributing factor" in the causation of violence in our society.
21. Id. at 1094-95.
22. Id.
23. Commission Statement on Violence in Television Entertainment Programs (released
September 23, 1969). The Commission's conclusion is not surprising in view of the laboratory
and clinical evidence to the same effect. See, e.g., LARsEN, VIOLENCE AND THE MASs MEDIA
(1968); WERTHAm, A SIGN FOR CAIN-AN ExPLORATIoN OF HUMAN VIoLFscE (1966); Bandura,
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Less than one month after the findings of the Violence Commis-
sion were made public, the Foundation to Improve Television filed
a petition with the FCC, requesting amendment of the FCC's Rules
and Regulations that would add sections designed to curb television
violence and horror. Eleven months later, on September 23, 1970,
the FCC sent a letter to the Foundation stating that the Surgeon
General of the United States was studying the problem of television
violence, and that the FCC was awaiting the results of that study.
The Surgeon General's advisory committee had been appointed at
the request of Senator John 0. Pastore as a result of hearings he had
chaired concerning television sex and violence. Those hearings' ob-
jectivity was questioned since the networks were allowed to censor
committee members of whom they did not approve. Nonetheless, on
January 19, 1972, the committee transmitted its report to the Sur-
geon General. The report concluded that viewing violence on televi-
sion is conducive to an increase in aggressive behavior in children
who are predisposed towards violence. Thus, even a committee
screened by the networks concluded that television violence is detri-
mental to some children. In this regard, it should be stressed that,
prior to the report, the networks claimed that television violence
was good for children since it provided a harmless release for their
aggression, or, alternatively, that there was no proof that it was bad
for children.
It is clear that television violence and horror is inimical to the
health and welfare of certain children who are predisposed toward
violence at the very least, and, quite probably, adversely affects
many more child viewers. Despite these well-known facts, the FCC
has done nothing to curtail the broadcast industries' propensity to
saturate television with violence and horror. 4 In contrast, the Chair-
man of the FCC was quoted as saying that the FCC must create
guidelines to keep movies that deal openly with sexual topics off of
Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models, 66 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3-
11 (1963); Bandura, Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Agression Models, 63
J. OF ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 575-82 (1961); Berkowitz, Film Violence and the Cue
Properties of Available Targets, 3 J. OF PERSONALITY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 525-30 (1966); Lov-
acs, Effect of Exposure to Symbolic Aggression on Aggressive Behavior, CHILD DEVELOPMENT
32, 37-44 (1961); Mussen and Rutherford, Effects of Aggressive Cartoons on Children's Ag-
gressive Play, 62 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 461-64 (1964).
24. Even the Surgeon General's committee recognized that the rate of violent episodes on
television remains fairly constant at about eight per hour and that Saturday morning cartoon
programs are saturated with violence.
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home television screens.2 It appears that the FCC is more concerned
with that old bogeyman "SEX" than with a proven instrument of
harm-television violence.
Other Viewpoints
The FCC's lack of concern with television violence and horror is
not shared by other countries. The Canadian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion has cancelled several programs produced in the United States
since they were excessively violent. Similar concern has been ex-
pressed in Great Britain due to a report of a government investigat-
ing committee emphasizing that violence on television can be un-
healthy and that the difficulties of a frustrated, maladjusted or
isolated individual can be intensified. The Australian Broadcasting
Control Board has cracked down on television violence, and the
Board of Censors in Germany has exhibited greater concern with the
depiction of brutality and horror on television than with the depic-
tion of sexual conduct. The United States alone condones daily
exposure to its children of television violence and horror.
An Opinion
We live in violent times. In the past decade, the United States
has suffered unprecedented increases in acts of violence. The atro-
cious crime has become commonplace. Even the bestial acts of a
Charles Manson or a Juan Corona have little shock value. It would
be naive'to claim that television violence has precipitated the do-
mestic ills that plague the country, but there has been a steady
stream of televised violence and horror for many, many years, and
a significant body of knowledgeable people believe that the constant
viewing of violence on television predisposes some individuals to-
wards violence, and creates an immunity to real-life violence in
others.2" These are reasons enough for the FCC to act. "It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is
paramount," and, "difference in the characteristics of new media
25. Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1969 at 1A, col. 1. The author is unaware of any studies
showing that the viewing of "blue" movies is harmful to anyone's mental health.
26. Recently a woman in Boston was forced to pour gasoline on her body and then was set
on fire by her attackers. The press drew a comparison of this scene to the film "Fuzz" which
contained a similar scene allegedly taking place in Boston, and which was televised in Boston
shortly before the attack took place. In Florida, a man was recently strangled with an instru-
ment similar to one featured in the ABC series "Kung Fu."
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justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them." 7 Children need the protection of a responsible FCC.
As recognized by Congress, the Courts, and the Attorney General,
the FCC possesses broad regulatory power over television program
content, but has exercised it sparingly. Whatever the reason for its
abstinence, the FCC should re-examine its policies and practices
with the view of becoming a more effective instrumentality of the
public interest. It is incumbent upon the FCC to make a determina-
tion that television programming featuring excessive violence and
horror is not in the public interest, and to curtail the broadcast of
such programming.
27. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 386,
390 (1969).
